[sent to analytic re: what is philosophy]
... the problem is that the question imposes a game. When you ask "what is philosophy" you have to ask of what it is you want your brain to do that counts as an "answer." Presumably, you want to know what is "philosophy" as opposed to other things in your lexicon that are "not philosophy." The question here is whether you want your brain to distinguish or whether you want it to name. If we want the brain to name, we might say that philosophy is whatever those who are in the social club called "philosophy" are doing (club norms). This is philosophy as a social organization. It is distinct in this respect from other club organizations. Note that what makes "philosophy" different here is that it names objects: this is rotary, this is the chamber of commerce, etc.
If you want the brain to distinguish rather than to name, however, you might say something like "philosophy is the art of exploring foundation in belief." This presents two issues. First, note that, if the definition were true, anyone who does the activity can be a "philosopher" (you don't need to belong to the club). Secondly, however, note that this "definition" causes the brain to strain in some way to separate (distinguish) it from other labels in the person's lexicon, such as "argumentation" "debate" "logic" and so forth. What do you mean by "philosophy" that you do not mean with these other labels? One presumes that when you ask "what is philosophy" that you are NOT asking, e.g., "what is logic plus debate." This is because a person who would ask a question with a sense like this would more likely not be an English speaker. For those types of inquiries, one would simply consult a dictionary. So the real question is whether
and how philosophy as an activity is different, if at all, among other activities such as art, debate clubs, English composition, logic, disputation, hypothesizing, conjecture -- or if all that it really is, is some sort of recipe of these things. (a blend idea).
One also has to be careful about something else. Wittgenstein rightly saw that language sets could be facile and that one's lexicon could implicate either confused or sophisticated grammar. When grammar is confused, the insightful have to "untie the knots," so to speak. One of the central claims he makes to Moore is that Moore plays a game within a game when says he knows he has a hand. That if we play (deploy) "knowledge" in communicative situations where the person is not actually removing doubt (that is, to stipulations), then one is left with a different sense of the word that never has any relevance to the key sense for which the idea is productively deployed. In short, you're left with a silly talking exercise. "you know you have a hand" "no you don't, your brain is in a vat." For this sort of activity, philosophy is what Eddie Brickell said best, "the talk on the cereal box" -- that is, an irrelevant conversation.
Actually, it might better be thought to be a simple training exercise, where the sophisticated come to learn that (a) the game exists; (b) the rules are thus; and (c) this play crisscrosses that play with this other one. Once minds that properly understand the rituals of philosophy see that this is the culprit behind all the club's disputation, one sees that the true objective in philosophy becomes peace not truth, and that all one can aspire to is be especially good at "untangling knots." And that if one were to be particularly useful in this regard, one would do it in other disciplines, because rehashing the old "my brain is in a vat" really isn't anything other than an exercise.