Thoughts on Faculty "Education"

It seems as though there are several sorts of faculty "profiles" or strategies in college these days. There is the option of doing nothing but presenting something in the nature of standardized ABC's -- the basic trivia of a subject. This approach might rely heavily upon a textbook. And there are those who rely heavily upon a pleasant sort of entertainment for students -- be it in their personality (interaction, arranging for talk) or in some sort of creative educational agenda (simulations and so forth). This approach uses entertainment and some kind of social psychology I think. And there are those who rely heavily on task assignments. They like to have kids doing small projects that they can manage and oversee (while they are away doing research). This approach is least labor-intensive from the standpoint of really wanting to prepare something in the class.

But there is a final pedagogy. And it says that what young minds must develop in college is not ABC's, skills such as how to use the library, or to feel the experience of "fun" in class. Rather, it is to inculcate the intellect with, shall we say, "voices." That it is to plant things in the mind that either grow or get stored somewhere, where they might later grow.

Of course, the truth is that many will not do anything with these seeds. They'll occupy the mind like other articles of junk. But still, with many (more?), these voices will stay throughout the life, either to be voiced away by the greater experiences of life or to be summoned in the aid of insight -- but either way to be a frame of reference.

I note this because I think college professors are in trouble these days. Too many are not intellectually interesting. Too many are data wonks. Too many are baby sitters or entertainers. Too many teach ABC's. Too many are now being replaced by online instruction, which can deliver information about as good as the next. Very few, I think, try to impress upon curiosity the gift of insight. Very few love the idea for its own sake any more. They day the Greeks die in the academy is the day that all the institutions are worthless in Rome.

the Value of "Philosophy" after Wittgenstein

[sent to analytic]

Hi Stuart.

Regarding your comments below, I offer the following.

1. One of the reasons that philosophy as a social club may not like Wittgensteinian thinking is purely for reasons of politics and social-group dynamics. The person who ends the club's big business isn't really going to be kept around as its beacon, if for no other reason than it makes for bad self interest.

2. But I think another reason why philosophy as a social club had to turn away from Wittgenstein was simply that no one could replicate his methods. All that people could do was either half-understand his ideas and criticize them, or come closer to understanding and teach them. In this sense Wittgenstein was almost religious (messianic). One had to decipher the word and wonder about the way. Because no one could "pick up the ball" as it were, philosophy as a social group had no choice but at some point to proceed with club activity. Incidentally, that is why this generation of club champions refer to Ludwig's methods as OLP, something which is (a) group ideology; and (b) not a very good understanding of what he was saying. 

3. But I think all of this Wittgensteinian-dissing is really problematic (on the part of the club). Because it seems to me that, even in the wake of Ludwig's discoveries, that philosophy still retains two extremely important missions. One of them it shares with history; the other with religion. Let me explain. The two missions are:

(a) It trains students in thinking exercises, the skills of which become helpful when exported into other disciplines. Just as history "perspectifies" (made that one up!) but is quite inadequate when left unto itself, so too does philosophy give a kind of perspective that is most useful when applied to a real problem. Show me any scientist or intellectual who doesn't understand history or philosophy, and I will show you a narrow mind and an incomplete intellectual/scientist. Now, this might not be true of pure trades. I imagine an accountant doesn't need to know history/philosophy to be a good accountant. But lawyers, judges, political scientists, artists -- you name it -- can benefit. In this sense, philosophy is an exercise room for a certain kind of cognition. 

(b) It carries on its "word." The fact of the matter is that the ideas that most philosophy professors have today in the social club are irrelevant. Or better yet: they are only relevant to themselves (to the group). This is true of all disciplines I think. The vast majority of club members do not produce anything original or lasting -- they just refurbish old ideas and go to conferences. But out of the club rituals -- out of keeping the activity alive -- someday someone spectacular will emerge as the generations pass. And hence, philosophy's story will continue. This is the function that philosophy has that it shares with religion. (I'm not saying that religion actually produces messiahs or anything; I'm saying it believes its group function is to pass on the word so that when critical events happen, the group across time is ready. By similar measure, philosophy as a social club keeps passing its story to people who don't produce breakthroughs, so
that, someday, someone will get the story and produce one) . 

4. Another thing that should be said about Wittgenstein's views about the role of philosophy is that they are not really understood well. Much of it gets lost in the language game. Because if philosophy is only a social club -- like a rotary -- well, then it needs no natural method. You can have people do logic, do experiments, make use of empirical literature, etc., in order to talk about things philosophy traditionally implicates. But if philosophy is a method -- and if Wittgenstein was right that it consists only in "untangling knots" caused by confusion in the language game -- then we have two conclusions: (a)  knot-fixing is still helpful; and (b) it needs to be used outside of ordinary philosophy to do the most good (so we don't have the problem of "animal belief" "I followed my ideology today," for example). And hence, we are now left with the following conclusions:

1. social clubbers caught in a meaningless tradition paradoxically have value (see (a) and (b))
2. social clubbers who are innovating and not doing philosophy-properly-conceived are still doing neat stuff, although it is not "really philosophy strictly speaking"
3. those who are untangling knots in other disciplines where it would be most useful are not numerous enough and in need of recruitment. (Translation to the social club: teach more Wittgenstein please!!!)

(P.S. You know, I don't know why philosophy isn't taught like a professional school, where the last subject you take is where they explain it was all just an exercise).

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
New Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860

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STUART SAID:

However, Wittgenstein does pose a problem for the philosophically
inclined since, if you take him at his word, there isn't a lot for
philosophers to do. Here we are on a list (or in some other venue)
banging back and forth about competing ideas we have about things.
While useful in getting clearer about this or that, what does it
really deliver for us in the end? Unless we're teaching as you are,
what is added to the world? And teaching philosophy so others can
some day teach it, well that seems to pose its own kind of problem,
doesn't it?

At least most other schools of philosophy think they are doing
something, think they are adding to the body of knowledge that
belongs to mankind. Popperians, for instance, think they are telling
scientists how to do their business. DRTsts think they are developing
new logical models which will help in certain fields, I suppose.
Logicians generally think theirs is a real field with a value that
goes beyond learning and playing the logic game. Certain
philosophers, like Searle, think they are guiding elements of the
research community down the right paths. Dennett at least steps into
the area of theoretical science when he endeavors to work with the
researchers in the AI field.

Teaching Supreme Court Decision Making From an Autonomous Perspective

 Hi Dr. Chen.

I just read your syllabus with interest. I hope you won't mind if I make a suggestion. One of the things that I have found helpful is not to teach Supreme Court decision making through the strictures of the social club. That is, I avoid like the plague saying that there are 3 or 4 theories to decision making (strategic, "legal" and so forth). This statement is illustrative of the problem that political science has had with this subject for a great deal of time now (no sign of it quitting either). Rather, what I say is only that social science as a GROUP has this perspective. It isn't what defines the issue; it's just their contribution. Outside of social science, other people who participate in the activity (legal culture) or who think abstractly about it (philosophy) have had different insights that don't fit well into the political science framework.

Really the best way to teach this issue is to transcend all the contexts you can. Be home to no one. What I do is show a how the issue of supreme judging was (a) birthed  and (b) came to develop. In essence, I teach the history of philosophy of law, scooping up the perspective of lawyers and social scientists along the way.  This way, I don't give the fiction that what is called "empirical analysis" by a particular network is the centerpoint of the discussion (which it surely is not).

But anyway, I'm not criticizing. I just printed the syllabus because I thought it was pretty good. You might want to look at my course to get some ideas about how to further develop a multi-disciplinary (or autonomous) take on the creation and development of supreme judging over time.

"Magazine Knowledge"

... so much of what is printed in the literature and texts of what is called "social science" is simply "magazine knowledge."

Why Doesn't Political Science Use "Emanuels?"

Why doesn’t political science have its own “Emanuels” (a popular version of a student-oriented commercial outline of what is taught in law school)? One easy answer might be that the commercial market for such a publication is poor. I do not buy this. You can find western history summaries and European history summaries in book stores. You can find micro and macro economics as well. I bet if you looked hard enough you could find one for psychology. But why no basic summary outline of the core findings of political scientists?

There appears to be only one of two answers to this question. Either political science has not produced any disciplinary “truths” that are universal among its practitioners, or the practitioners themselves are simply adverse to the transformation of  disciplinary knowledge into a concise, authoritative and hegemonic format. But again, why?

The thing that is nice about law school is its structure (to say nothing of the ridiculous educational methodology, the deficiency of its curriculum – Plumbing I, Plumbing II, etc., -- or the narrowness of its favorite intellectual aptitude). But there is no reason why political science could not take its body of intellectual contribution and put it into a format that says “this is what we know best,” and “this is still around, but not considered paradigm.” It would be just like Emanuels listing the “majority rule” and “minority rule.” An entry about the American policy process, for example, might indicate that neopluralism is the preferred view of the policy process, and that the non-preferred (“minority rules”) are elite theory, perfect pluralism and democratic theory. Ada W. Finifter is the only scholar who I know that tried to summarize disciplinary knowledge, but I think the general consensus found his work to be problematic. (Correct me if I am wrong. I only remember my dislike for the book in graduate school many years ago). Wouldn’t graduate students benefit from an Emanuels kind of product? Wouldn’t it give our endeavors more structure? Sometimes I feel that all political science wants to be is a form of “art camp.”