Discussion with Chris Green

(discussing my paper with chris green on conlawprof)
 
Hi Chris. Just a couple of thoughts while I am still grading exams today ....

The key issue here seems to be twofold. (1). Whether it is POSSIBLE to have a "constitution" that has a fine print clause that made the meaning of its words NOT be the meaning of its words (denying brains their ordinary cognition of those words). And (2), whether there is any way that our constitution can be said to have this in Article VI, using methods OTHER THAN  originalism (because that involves a language fallacy and begs the question). 

Please note that if our constitution had such a clause, it would make the meaning of the words idiosyncratic. Sort of like a private language. It would mean that "cruel" meant the 1787 "grocery list" rather than what the term really means (which is, "assemble such a list"). I address this philosophically in chapter 2 of my paper. The only kinds of words that do this in the language culture are forms of tautological jargon. You seem to think that legal jargon does this too. It does, but not with ORDINARY words. A perfect example is Schedule II Controlled Substance. That is a word which says "use only this grocery list." So if the constitution had said, "apply the Cruelty Protocol System of 1787," and then defined this, we would say it was legal jargon that performed the cognitive task that you are trying to impose upon ordinary words. (Please see Chapter 2, part III). 

So what I am saying is that a fine print clause, if true, would make every word in the constitution a protocol-bearing word. Surely, for our Constitution to have such a clause, it would have to say it in language, not in the protocol of language. It may be an historic question what any particular generation had in mind whenever it enacted something, but it is an ANTHROPOLOGICAL question what the words of their speech meant culturally. And hence, anything that looked for some historical artifact would by definition be looking only for what I call "artisan logic" rather than "telephone logic." (See Chapter 2, page 26).

Now, you seem to be saying in your indexicals paper that the very term "constitution" means "a protocol-word document." This reminds me of those who say that "marriage is between a husband and wife." (See Chapter 2, 31-35). The problem here is twofold: (1) you would have to show that this was true anthropologically (not in legal documents, but in the semantic culture); and (2) you would have to show that this was not itself a sense of talking (compare: bachelor [same portion of my paper]). You also are going to have to deal with the fact that constitutionalism was new and that, like the term "science," its lexicon develops.

Here's the bottom line. Given what we know about the cognition of language, it would be extremely difficult to say that "constitution" is NOT a family resemblance word. It seems that the best you can hope for is that anthropology might say it had a peculiar sense of talking within its family cluster (something I still don't believe yet).

One of the things that is critically important here is this: what does a democratic ritual "pass?" I contend it passes only its language. Do you disagree with that? Because that means that any sense of "constitution" that is in the lexicon back then is fair play today (without even getting into the issue of lexicon growth over time)

I've got to run. Let's continue to discuss tomorrow or the next day. (More to say later). 

There Is No Such Thing as Original Meaning

(sent to conlaw prof re: the "original meaning" of the equal protection clause)

One who says that Brown violates the "original meaning" of the sentence, "No State shall deny ... equal protection," says, in essence, that the sentence is a code of some sort. That it has some sort of secret language or something. Like you have to go into the temple to see what it really says. (It reminds me of Wittgenstein's comments about private languages).

In fact, the sentence doesn't need much deciphering as an English sentence at all -- worst case, it's a little poetic. It might be similar to the way one reads poetry when seeing it. It means to give people certain things and to provide an even-handed sort of thing.

But the point is that the meaning of the sentence is NOT determined by how post-Civil War culture behaved. That is a CONSTRUCTION. That is only an interpretation of the meaning, not the meaning itself. There are many possible behaviors that conform. That would be like saying that when Socrates first used the term Good, that we are forever bound by that implementation. The phrase "equal protection" means a family of things and has many accompanying behaviors. You cannot utter something flowery and have it mean only what the first behavioral output is. Language doesn't work that way.  If you want to regiment with language, you need rigid designators and complicated sentences. There is no such thing as an original meaning of a word that asks a person to use judgment to "follow" it.  

Imagine the constitution saying, "you have the right to dance." If they dance a certain way in 1787, is that the "original meaning" of the term? It is not, because language is not a picture. It doesn't work that way.

What I think you mean to say is that Brown is not obedient to the original racial ideology that prevailed in the mid 1800s. This is about politics, not language.    
 
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
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Thoughts on Faculty "Education"

It seems as though there are several sorts of faculty "profiles" or strategies in college these days. There is the option of doing nothing but presenting something in the nature of standardized ABC's -- the basic trivia of a subject. This approach might rely heavily upon a textbook. And there are those who rely heavily upon a pleasant sort of entertainment for students -- be it in their personality (interaction, arranging for talk) or in some sort of creative educational agenda (simulations and so forth). This approach uses entertainment and some kind of social psychology I think. And there are those who rely heavily on task assignments. They like to have kids doing small projects that they can manage and oversee (while they are away doing research). This approach is least labor-intensive from the standpoint of really wanting to prepare something in the class.

But there is a final pedagogy. And it says that what young minds must develop in college is not ABC's, skills such as how to use the library, or to feel the experience of "fun" in class. Rather, it is to inculcate the intellect with, shall we say, "voices." That it is to plant things in the mind that either grow or get stored somewhere, where they might later grow.

Of course, the truth is that many will not do anything with these seeds. They'll occupy the mind like other articles of junk. But still, with many (more?), these voices will stay throughout the life, either to be voiced away by the greater experiences of life or to be summoned in the aid of insight -- but either way to be a frame of reference.

I note this because I think college professors are in trouble these days. Too many are not intellectually interesting. Too many are data wonks. Too many are baby sitters or entertainers. Too many teach ABC's. Too many are now being replaced by online instruction, which can deliver information about as good as the next. Very few, I think, try to impress upon curiosity the gift of insight. Very few love the idea for its own sake any more. They day the Greeks die in the academy is the day that all the institutions are worthless in Rome.

The False Mind Body Problem in Philosophy

(sent to analytic. The poster says that when two people disagree about whether a tree exists independently of a mind, it is a real problem for philosophy. I claim it is not. He says that if you do not directly confront the issue over whether tree is "real," you are only hiding the disagreement) 

Walter:

When you talk to an idealist using his/her language framework, you are not "hiding the disagreement." To the contrary, you are directly confronting it by showing the person that the redundancy they impose in speech ("phenomenal-phenomenal") is not consequential to anything. It's not consequential because the disagreement is only over how to characterize something, not the something itself.  (You say that I've said this and you disagree. But I can only say it again, because you don't appear to understand.) One who says tree versus "treeness" to describe something that in every respect appears as the same X before each brain in the discussion -- each being healthy and behaving the same toward the tree -- does nothing other than disagree about what to call their X. This is because he does not deny that "tree exists" is "true," where that merely means to his brain "ostensification confirmed;" he only means to speak of it in a different categorical
scheme ("treeness presents"). You are arguing only over the order of his housekeeping. It's like arguing whether to categorize in descending versus ascending order. You are only arguing only over his affiliation.

The only way a real dispute would exist is if he were to begin to treat the external world differently. If he were to try to will the tree away or try to run through it for example. Then, you have a real problem. But even here, the issue is not philosophical (one of disputation), its medical and therapeutic.   

The only other point I would make to you is that it matters least of all what people on this board think of Wittgenstein or about their profession when discussing this.  It also matters not that intellectual history saw philosophy take on a particular form. The question is only whether in a dispute such as this one should deploy a ritual of disputation that seeks to root for an affiliation. Do you realize that this is all you are doing -- rooting for the tree?

Why root for the tree, Walter, when you can root for the Steelers?  Just speak the man's redundancy and move on.  After being spoken to enough this way, he'll probably stop with this sort of languaging maneuver anyway.
 
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
New Website: http://seanwilson.org
Daily Visitors: http://seanwilson.org/homepagelucy.html
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860

Explaining Language Games and Grammar

(sent to analytic)

Stuart:

I have not said anything that controverted W's idea of "something being hidden." I have not spoken of the "thought of pain," for example.  The question is this: is the idea of "grammar" for Wittgensteinian-inspired folk: (a) an automation in the brain; (b) an autonomy in the brain (free-for-all); or (c) a anthropologic derivative used in a behavior.

The answer is clearly (c). Language is use, and use can be stupid.  

Larry's posts about the concept of language game imply a conception of grammar that is too normative (too automated).

Regards.   Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant ProfessorWright State UniversityNew Website: http://seanwilson.org/Daily Visitors: http://seanwilson.org/homepagelucy.htmlSSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860