With a hat tip to Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, I decided to name this The Phenomenology of Morals although it would be better named The Phenomenology of Moral Thought (or of the Moral). It is not concerned with morals, as in any particular code of righteous behavior, but with the moral project itself, the thing we do which may rightly be called moral valuing.

The ideas presented here are a tighter recap of the ideas I worked out in my book Value and Representation: Three Essays Exploring the Implications of a Pragmatic Epistemology for Moral Thought. There my main thrust was to apply an analysis based on an account of knowledge grounded in American Pragmatism to the moral sphere by exploring the nature of valuation as a pragmatic activity which makes both knowledge and judgement, including moral judgment, possible. This somewhat truncated account, which I decided to share here, offers a briefer but also less detailed version of the thesis I laid out in that book . . . .