If Chomsky is right, that language is an emergent feature of the human brain, then practice a la Wittgenstein, seems to play second fiddle at best to the explanation of language's occurrence and how it works. More, it makes what we know about our world a function of what we ARE rather than where we are and among whom we stand -- which I think is a better way of accounting for human knowledge and human disagreements. While the implications of a thesis like Chomsky's for philosophical thought may not be massive (we can get away with philosophizing whether we think language is a genetic endowment or a learned practice), it does have some bearing on how we understand our world and our place in it (both traditional philosophical concerns). And it certainly affects how we explain and work with human language in its many variations. In what follows I address this issue with regard to Robert Hanna's position on the underpinnings of logical reasoning:

In Rationality and Logic (MIT Press—A Bradford Book, January 2009), Robert Hanna argues for an innate logical capacity along the lines of Chomsky's innate "universal grammar" consisting of a certain functional capacity to arrange information in the mind in ways that enable language to happen, underpinning the various and diverse grammatical mechanisms which every language uses to make sounds into sense. Of course, our brains have all sorts of capacities, but the one which distinguishes us from other animals, especially other primates, is language, and for Chomsky, this requires an underlying capacity to forge meanings through the syntactical methods speakers use to arrange their sounds, signs or gestures. Ours is not the largest brain in the animal world nor the most complex, yet our brains have what other animal brains lack. We speak and are spoken to, making something more than noise out of our utterances. Chomsky argues that this facility appears so abruptly and so rapidly in human children, and involves so much complexity in grammatical expression (which differs dramatically from language to language), that no child could possibly learn it all, with its seemingly infinite possibility of expression, unless something more than mere experiential learning were at work. ....