Science, as the pursuit of knowledge about the tangible world, the world we can observe via our senses, is about developing beliefs which fit with things we already think we have reason to take to be true. And judgment, the assessment of those reasons, is no less valuational than moral claims are. It's just that scientific pursuits, the search for truths about the world, rely on different facts: the publicly observable sort which others can see and agree to. Moral truths, on the other hand, which also involve observations of course, look elsewhere, i.e., they oblige us to consider what is the case about ourselves and, by extension, others who are selves like us. They require attention to a concept rather than something we can see in the world and the concept is that of selfhood, i.e., what we understand about ourselves, our own way of being in the world. Rather than to theories about how things are as in scientific questions, moral questions focus on how we are. Moral valuation has a different target than the valuing we usually think of as truth-making. Its ground is the concept of what we, ourselves are, in this case of being a self, a subject in a world. . . .