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Philosophy abounds in “isms,” theories of what is and of how what is can be what it is. One of these “ism” questions revolves around the real vs. fictivist debate or Realism vs. Anti-Realism. This dispute asks us how we know when something is real as opposed to when it’s just made up in some fashion or other, a concoction of our language, there to serve a purpose that is not based on denotation, as in pointing to something discernible in the world, but rather to express or stand in for some other, less concrete idea. When is an ascription of a thing a real ascription of something that actually exists and when is it just doing some linguistic duty in order to simplify how we speak with one another?
In the case of the Realism vs. Anti-Realism dispute we want to know when is the name of something really of something and when is it a case of pretend, however convenient for our interlocutory purposes. Is reality only to be found in what we can put our hands on, see with our own eyes, smell, taste or hear? Do our senses alone determine what's real and if something we speak of is not sensible in this way, is it then not really real? Or must we expand our universe of allowable ontological elements to things that are intangible, unobservable, as well, to things not subject to sensory-conditioned experience? Are abstract ideas real? Numbers? Thoughts? Beliefs? Attitudes? Hopes? Fears? Are there really minds or just dispositions to behave? . . .