The point of "conceptualism," at least as I have presented it here and elsewhere, is to move us away from Kant's notion of innate forms that shape our ideas (ideas which are developed in response to the inflow of sensory inputs). It's not that we aren't constrained by what the physical reality of our bodies are capable of taking in and making use of. Of course we are. It's that an idea, like Kant's idea, that we have certain intuited forms (e.g., of space, time, causation and so forth which somehow enstructure our inputs and so produce concepts) is misleading on my view. Of course we have and use concepts and of course they matter. But they aren't inherent in us but a function of how we respond to the world.

In other words, it's not that we have the "intuitions" Kant names, but that we have the tools to formulate the structures that grant us the capacity to form and utilize mental images, as a result of our sensory inputs, in getting about in the world and these look like "intuitions" to us . . . .