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Stuart W. Mirsky
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Stuart W. Mirsky (Stuart W. Mirsky is the principal author of this blog).
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Sean Wilson's Blog:


Ludwig Wittgenstein:

 For me, Scalia was a terrible judge. And he was terrible because his decisions relied upon intellectual behaviors that were dominant in history at least one century prior to his time on the bench. He used an a-priori format, syllogistic reasoning, formalism, and took positions about ...
... pretty good stuff here. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/was-wittgenstein-right/?_r=1 But here is my only complaint. Characterizing Wittgenstein's negative attitudes about the field of philosophy, Horwich writes: " There are no startling discoveries to be made ... 'from the armchair' through some blend of intuition, pure reason and ...
... open access special edition published. Looks promising. Anna Boncompagni is one of the authors.
This looks interesting. The way they have framed the issue looks very good. The question is whether the idea of connoisseurship will even enter the picture at all (as it should). The book I am working on now will expand upon this idea. Why do I ...
I am seeking feedback on the enclosed proposal. I wonder if people think it looks like a viable project? Would the thesis of such a book interest you? Basically, the book is a bit personal: it's based upon an intellectual transformation that I went through and ...
... new set of lectures was posted today. It's on Wittgenstein and Philosophy. Will have the final set of lectures, called Wittgenstein on Intelligence, up tomorrow (hopefully). Moore & His Hands Form of Life False Problems Example: Free Will Senses of Knowledge On Definitions Gettier & Banality Alternative Lexicons On ...
... a lecture containing Wittgensteinian approaches to language. Specifically covers precision-talking, names, jargon, family resemblance, senses of talking -- you name it, it's there. http://ludwig.squarespace.com/cond6/
In this lecture, we see Wittgenstein shed the Tractarian orientation and adopt something that he would later call "the new thinking." http://ludwig.squarespace.com/cond5/
Your browser does not support the video tag.
Italian economist Piero Sraffa is credited with causing Wittgenstein to adopt an "anthropological perspective" toward language. One of conversations between the two involved Sraffa's using a "Neapolitan gesture." This video shows how gestures of this sort lack a picture-reality correspondence, which caused Wittgenstein to abandon the ...
Not enough attention is given to Wittgenstein shunning his immense inheritance. What is interesting is that he did this as a young man and showed no indication throughout life to have ever regretted it. It would be one thing to see someone in their later years ...
... new lecture uploaded on Wittgenstein in transition. Has some clips from A.J. Ayer on Logical Positivism. But, overall, nothing too special here: just a hand-waiving lecture. http://ludwig.squarespace.com/cond4/2014/2/20/01-logical-positivism.html
Wittgenstein's example of philosophical scholarship shews an arrogant and radical ideology hiding inside. Wittgenstein wasn't a worker bee slaving for a literature community. He wasn't a member of the "club." He understood that a "company man" could never be a great thinker. Today, however, the academy ...
... just finished putting my newest version of the Tractatus lecture online. Some audio clips are old, however, because my batteries died in the middle of one session. Still, it is pieced together (reconstructed) accurately. http://ludwig.squarespace.com/cond3/2014/1/29/01-the-genesis-of.html
"The world is the totality of facts, not of things," Wittgenstein proclaims in the Tractatus. In this video, this idea is explained. Specifically, the idea of a thought being a picture of a possible state of affairs, for which the proposition claims to be true or ...
There is an old thread on this subject which has been revived on Duncan Richter's blog. You might want to have a look: http://languagegoesonholiday.blogspot.com/2012/11/did-wittgenstein-believe-in-god.html
I've never seen this before. I wonder if anyone can comment on when it was taken? Or the circumstances? He sort of reminds me of Elvis in this one. Click the picture to see where it came from.
A lecture that looks at Bertrand Russell, the analytic movement that he and Gottlob Frege nurtured, and the role that early Ludwig Wittgenstein played. The lecture takes us from Wittgenstein's first year at Cambridge, when he was captured by Russell's analytic patriotism, through to his departure ...
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/11/the-stereotypes-about-math-that-hold-americans-back/281303/ ... article seems to support the idea that traditional and formalistic approaches to mathematics were themselves an unnecessary dressing. If true, an interesting idea: one that has resonance with the notion that meaning is more important than analysis and that "getting it" is something different ...
(sent to analytic re: whether misplaying in a "language game" is a matter of breaching an implied customary rule for communication. Here's the quick answer: the idea is too anthropologic and needs something ideational) ... I am so happy you brought this up. Because this is exactly what ...
    
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Duncan Richter's Blog:

The review is here. Thankfully, even though it does mention me, it doesn't say anything bad about my contribution. (Perhaps tactfully, it says almost nothing at all about it.) Here's a taste of the review: This volume is a valuable addition to this growing literature, with a lucid ...
These are all just coincidences, I suppose, but there are some striking similarities between some of Wittgenstein's acts and ideas and elements of War and Peace. Here are three. The Tractatus contains seven main propositions, which are to be overcome in order to see the ...
One of my favorite authors on why fiction is not a distraction from reality. Here's a taste: The night time dream is chaotic and can be genuinely frightening. The dream we call life is filled with joy and suffering, but for many people a lot more ...
It seems paradoxical to write the question, "Does writing exist?" but what I mean is: is there some thing called writing that someone can be good or bad at, teach, or simply do? According to John Warner, we know how to teach writing. But what is ...
This Guardian essay on neoliberalism is frustrating in some ways (too cloudy at key points, and too prone to ad hominem insults), but it's interesting, and brings out the importance of Friedrich von Hayek, whose work probably ought to be engaged with more just because it ...
Moving to this country was the the first time I ever flew in a plane. I landed in Charlottesville, where I lived for five years. I still live just over an hour's drive from there, and go there quite often to eat a meal, do some ...
This looks interesting, in terms of both content and the decision to publish free and online. The title is Pictorial Truth: Essays on Wittgenstein, Realism, and Conservatism, and it's by Kristóf Nyíri. He writes: I am really curious how the scholarly world will react e.g. to ...
My friend Chris Gavaler has co-written a piece with Nathaniel Goldberg on Trump and bullshit for Philosophy Now. If you're interested in this subject then, obviously, you might want to read it. Their conclusion is that a sample of Trump's speech is "beyond bullshit." Here's ...
I talked a bit about Stephen Mulhall's The Great Riddle here and here. This is the last post I intend to write about it, and it's about the part of the book I like the most. Near the end, Mulhall refers to "the sheer wild particularity ...
[What follows is little more than a bunch of quotes strung together. But they are good quotes.] The desirability of seeing what is under our noses and thereby becoming free is a bit of a theme in 19th century European thought. Here's Father ...
Perhaps this isn't worth a blog post, but it's not as if I've been posting much otherwise. Sometimes it's better to have low standards. So here goes. Two things strike me as not just true but obviously true about any increase in the legal minimum ...
This paper needs quite a bit of work, but for anyone interested here is an only very slightly (so far) revised version of the paper I presented at the conference on Peter Winch last weekend in London.
If you're interested in Peter Winch on understanding others, you might be interested in this documentary. Perhaps it's well known, but I only just found it: And here's one on Evans-Pritchard: I haven't watched either one yet, so can't guarantee their quality.
A new issue (Vol 6 No 1 (2017)) is available here.
Some questions that you might want to ask Stephen Mulhall when you read his new book: if talk about God is nonsense, why bother?if talk about God has a use, mustn't it thereby have a meaning after all?if you accept that nonsense is nonsense, that there ...
Just in case anyone's interested, I've revised this paper. The new version is here.
Are there any bad ones? These are the best, and only, three I know: "Woody Allen" by Allo Darlin', "What's Yr Take on Cassavetes" by Le Tigre, and "Roman P" by Psychic TV. The videos aren't very exciting, but the performances are ...
This site looks great. It is designed to be a teaching resource for people who teach philosophy but want to diverge from the usual texts and topics taught. So if you want to teach some Asian philosophy, for instance, this site will (it is not yet complete) ...
I'm enjoying Stephen Mulhall's The Great Riddle very much. Here he is on religious language: ...insofar as God is the source of all that is, possessing in his being all the perfections he causes, then everything in creation is a potential source of imagery for the ...
Matthew Yglesias has an interesting essay on Trump and bullshit at Vox, but I think he goes too far in his attempt to explain what's going on. Here's an example: When Trump says something like he’s just learned that Barack Obama ordered his phones wiretapped, he’s ...

Entries in Michael Huemer (2)

11:20AM

Rejecting Morality

Continuing my efforts to look at the notion of moral valuing and the different explanations of how it works that it inspires, I recently had occasion to read Beyond Morality by Richard Garner. Actually I read his updated on-line version, Beyond Beyond Morality, which seems to be his effort to improve his earlier published book. Presumably his basic thesis hasn't changed although he has attempted to amplify and strengthen it for his readers. In a nutshell, the book rejects morality as such based on his embrace of the Humean picture of moral judgment being grounded solely in sentiment. But unlike others influenced by the Humean account, such as the non-cognitivists (emotivism, prescriptivism) or the subjectivists (those who ground moral discourse in individual preferences and those who ground it in consensus preference within particular groups), and, of course, unlike intuitionists like Michael Huemer (who argue that moral claims are cognitively respectable because they address rationally knowable facts derived from our concepts, themselves), Garner (like J. L. Mackie before him) rejects the idea that moral claims state any facts at all. There is no moral knowledge, he argues, and that's a good thing . . .

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9:16AM

Ethical Intuitionism and the Idea of Intrinsic Goodness

Been reading a book I picked up the other day, Ethical Intuitionism by Michael Huemer who teaches philosophy at the University of Colorado (Boulder). As the title suggests, he makes an argument for intuitionism in ethics, a la Moore, despite the fact that this tradition has fallen on hard times since Moore and Sidgwick first began pushing it. After taking apart the current meta-ethical theories that grew up in the shadow of Moore's Principia Ethica, including non-cognitivism (he includes here the expressivism/emotivism of people like Ayer and Stevenson as well as the prescriptivism of Hare), subjectivism (in which he includes, somewhat counter-intuitively, all moral accounts that stand on the idea of some opinion or authority including the idea that our moral views just state our personal preferences, the preferences of our community, the preferences of an "ideal observer" or the preferences of a deity), and nihilism (the position that there are no moral truths at all, just the illusion that there are) he proceeds to make his case for the intuitionist account.

His position rests on a Kantian a priorism that holds that knowledge, even that which we think of as empirical, is grounded in intellectual intuitions such as the idea that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, that time is ordered (one moment follows another and precedes the next) and that things cannot be both red and blue all over and at the same time. He argues that these are indubitable propositions, requiring neither proof nor grounding but, which, themselves, form the ground of other things we know in an empirical sense. Similarly he argues that there are moral intuitions we have such that some things just are "intrinsically" good. The intrinsicness, he finds, in the concepts our words for these "things" represent. He makes the important point that even in logic, no syllogism is valid unless it is understood as such (the implications of the structure of premises is recognized) and that this, too, is a priori though there is no guarantee that we come to see it. To get the validity of any syllogism we have to recognize it and sometimes we do so only by having the connections made explicit though we do implicitly recognize validity when it is there, even if we may not always understand what's going on or the why's of logic.

After establishing the relevance and reality of what he takes to be the a priori he goes on to equate moral intuitions with such a priori knowledge. Relying on a principle he calls "phenomenal conservatism" (the idea that we should take things to be as they appear, absent some additional reason to think they aren't) he argues that the ethical intuitions we have represent a kind of truth unless and until other intuitions conflict with them. He doesn't argue that an ethical intuition is certain, that it can never be wrong, but only that it is prima facie the case absent information to the contrary and should be treated as such. . . .

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